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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: 
QUESTIONABLE PREMISES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
KEITHN. HYLTON & VINCENTD. ROUGEAU· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Having just passed the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of the 
Community Reinvestment Act 1 ("CRA" or "Act"), this is an appropriate 
time to take stock of the effectiveness of the legislation and to consider 
whether it continues to be useful as a tool for addressing the problems of 
neighborhood decline and discrimination in the lending market. Although 
discrimination in lending and the decline of certain inner-city neighborhoods 
is a problem that the CRA has not been able to solve, most observers would 
agree that the situation has improved since the mid-1970s. 2 In particular, 
there has been notable progress toward the elimination of explicit redlining3 
- a problem the CRA was designed to address. 4 Perhaps it is impossible to 
demonstrate what portion of that progress is due to the CRA itself and what 
is a result of broader economic and social change that has occurred in this 
country over the last twenty years. Nevertheless, both supporters and 
opponents of the CRA generally agree that the Act has been an important 
factor in pushing banks to lend in previously under-served areas.5 
* Keith N. Hylton is a Professor at Boston University School of Law, Boston, 
Massachusetts; he can be contacted bye-mail at knbylton@bu.edu. Vincent D. 
Rougeau is an Associate Professor at Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
The authors thank participants in workshops at Boston University and the University 
of Southern California Law Center for helpful responses to this paper. The authors 
thank the Center for New Black Leadership for fmancial support and Deborah Loesel 
for research assistance. 
1 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994). 
2 See Allen I. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act after Fifteen Years: It 
Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.I. 
293,310 (1993). 
3 See id. at 303-04 (describing efforts to increase better lending performance). 
4 See id.; A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1431, 1453 (1995). 
5 See Fishbein, supra note 2, at 294; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 347 
(1993); see also Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic 
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In this paper we will argue that the CRA as it is currently understood 
and enforced is no longer an appropriate tool for dealing with discrimination 
in the lending market and the lack of access to credit in neighborhoods 
dominated by minorities and people of modest, or minimal, means. The 
statute is based on premises that are questionable in today's lending market, 
and thus it is not clear that the social benefits provided by the statute are 
significant. Further, enforcement of the statute generates certain perverse 
incentives that are costly to society. We emphasize the costly incentive 
effects in this paper.6 While the goals of the CRA remain desirable, the 
current enforcement framework should be reformed. 
II. THE eRA DEBATE AND THE REVISED eRA 
REGULATIONS 
A. Background on the eRA Debate 
The Community Reinvestment Act, enacted as Title VIII of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, requires appropriate 
federal banking regulators to "encourage ... [financial] institutions to help 
meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered 
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."7 The 
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights. and 
Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1463, 1488 (1994) (discussing bank 
agreements with community groups in under-served communities). 
6 Since the passage of the CRA, there have been several law review articles 
examining the desirability of the legislation from an economic perspective. See, e.g., 
Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, 
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 
(1996); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 291; Peter P. Swire, The Persistent 
Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics AnalYSis, 73 TEx. L. 
REv. 787 (1995); Taibi, supra note 5, at 1465; Lawrence 1. White, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 281 (1993). 
In writing this paper, we set out to make two contributions to this literature. 
First, we wanted to state the premises or assumptions of the CRA's proponents in a 
reasonably (or highly) defensible form and examine those premises in light of 
current market conditions. We thought that there was a tendency in some of the 
economic critiques of the CRA to put the proponents arguments in a weak form. 
Second, and most important, we wanted to provide a careful statement of the 
incentive effects of the statute. The earlier articles on the CRA have not provided as 
careful an analysis of the incentive effects as we provide here. 
7 12 U.S.C. § 290 1 (b) (1994). 
HeinOnline -- 18 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 165 1999
1999] CRA: QUESTIONABLE PREMISES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES 165 
statute provides that regulators should evaluate a financial institution's eRA 
perfonnance "when examining financial institutions" and that regulators may 
take CRA perfonnance into account "in an application for a deposit 
facility. "8 
From the perspective of the banking industry, the heart of the 
argument against the CRA focuses on its cost. The CRA imposes an 
enonnous regulatory burden on banking institutions, which requires 
extensive data collection and record keeping.9 In recent years, profound 
changes in the banking marketplace have meant that banks and savings banks 
have been bearing the burden of CRA compliance, while other non-banking 
institutions have been able to enter the lending market free from any 
responsibilities under the Act.IO Simply put, this provides a major cost 
advantage to many institutions that compete against banks and savings banks 
for a share of the lending market. Furthennore, CRA enforcement has been 
primarily through protests of bank expansion applications by community 
groups, which has caused many institutions to acquiesce to expensive 
demands in order to avoid negative publicity or major delays.11 On a more 
theoretical level, many in the banking industry are philosophically opposed 
to "credit allocation," or government-mandated lending to specific groups or 
geographic areas, and believe that a competitive market for financial services 
would be more effective than the CRA in addressing the problems of lending 
discrimination and redlining.12 
Community groups have insisted over the years that the regulators 
have not held banks accountable on their CRA perfonnance and it is only 
8 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2). 
9 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 324-25 (stating that "[b]ankers today 
regard the CRA as the single most costly regulation facing them .... "). 
10 See Ralph T. King Jr., Skewed Marketing: Some Mortgage Firms Neglect Black 
Areas More than Banks Do, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at A4 (noting that 
unregulated mortgage bankers make up 75 of the 100 largest mortgage lenders; 
however, 50 of those 75 showed "deficient" levels of lending in black areas). The 
disparate application of the CRA also has been criticized on a conceptual level. See, 
e.g., Leonard Bierman et aI., The Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary 
Empirical Analysis, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 383, 406-07 (1994) (noting that the CRA 
"regulatory tax" discriminates in favor of non-banks); Overby, supra note 4, at 1442 
(pointing out that the CRA provides no justification for why only certain types of 
institutions were selected for coverage). 
II See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 333-34; Taibi, supra note 5, at 1487-88. 
12 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 333-34. 
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through outside' pressure that any real change has occurred)3 These groups 
have generally urged tougher enforcement of the CRA by calling for public 
disclosure of examinations and strong sanctions for poor CRA performance, 
such as civil money penalties and cease and desist orders.l4 These groups 
argue that in order for the CRA to have any real effect, it has to be more than 
an aspiration; the legislation has to be given some teeth. Community groups 
want the CRA to produce tangible results, and they want recalcitrant 
institutions forced to improve.ls 
These conflicting views on the CRA came to a head over the last few 
years, following the 1992 election of President Clinton and the 1994 election 
of a Republican Congress. President Clinton, along with most Democrats, is 
a strong supporter of the CRA. On the other hand, most Republicans are 
sympathetic to the banking industry's problems with the CRA and support 
changes to the Act ranging from outright repeal to streamlined 
enforcement.I6 In 1993, President Clinton called for a complete overhaul of 
the eRA regulations then in effect,l1 In 1995, the bank regulatory agencies 
promulgated revised CRA regulations that were designed to address some of 
the important concerns of the banking industry and community groups.l8 
These revisions were followed by a report from the General Accounting 
Office ("GAO") to the Congress, which evaluated the effectiveness of the 
Act and prospects for improvement under the new regulations. 
13 See Richard P. Marsico, Fighting Poverty through Community Empowerment 
and Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281,282 (l995) (arguing 
that the objectives of community groups are thwarted by weak enforcement of the 
CRA). 
14 See id. at 297 (explaining that although community groups have used the CRA 
to secure funding for development projects, they are unable to meet all of the needs 
perceived within low-income communities). 
IS See JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 38 (I 980} (writing that community groups are critical of banks for being too 
conservative in their overall lending policies, having an insufficiently local focus 
within their defmed service areas, and failing to provide broad enough lending 
services). 
16 See Steven Kalar, Note, Two Steps Back: British Lessons for American Fair 
Lending Reform, 19 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 139, 141 (l995) (discussing 
the benefits of repealing the CRA). 
17 See Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton to Seek Rules to Cut Paperwork for Banks, to 
Boost Lending in Poor Areas, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at B2. 
18 See 12 C.F.R. pts. 25,228,345, 563e (1997); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 (regarding the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act). 
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B. The GAO Report19 
Ironically, after extensive discussions with all of key parties in the 
eRA debate, the GAO found some general agreement about the major 
problems with the Act. Four issues were identified: (1) the eRA relies too 
heavily on documentation of efforts and processes and too little on lending 
results, which leads to an excessive paperwork burden; (2) the regulators are 
inconsistent in their conduct of eRA exams; (3) the examinations are often 
based on insufficient information and may not accurately reflect an 
institution's performance; and (4) the regulatory enforcement of the eRA 
relies too heavily on community group protests against expansion plans. 20 
Of course, these groups do not necessarily agree on how the eRA should be 
enforced and the affected parties differ on what they see as an effective 
response to these problems.21 
For example, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") data 
provide information on lending results, but they also present numerous 
interpretive problems.22 The GAO found that many bankers were concerned 
that HMDA data could be misleading if not properly explained and that some 
of the information reveals too much about their business and should not be 
publicly disclosedP Bankers also objected to having to provide additional 
data that they would not ordinarily generate as part of and which "may not 
fully reflect their [normal] business activities."24 The regulators believed 
that statistical data were necessary for judging eRA compliance, but were 
only useful if accurate.2S They also noted problems with HMDA data, which 
they said were sometqnes poorly kept or inconsistently reported. 26 The 
limitations of the data make additional information essential, particularly 
when an institution is not heavily involved in mortgage lending.2' Finally, 
there were concerns about the limited regulatory resources available for eRA 
enforcement. Some examiners lacked the time or training necessary to 
19 GENERAL Acer. OFF. (GAO), GGD-96-23, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Aer: 
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA B-259931 (Nov. 28, 
1995) [hereinafter GAO REPoRT]. 
20 See id. at 44. 
21 See id. at 44, 45. 
22 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 274-79. 
23 See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 47. 
24 Id. 
2S See id. at 48. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
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perfonn proper analyses of HMDA data.28 Many bankers complained that 
the examiners' eRA reviews often were arbitrary and inconsistent. 29 
The revised eRA regulations attempt to address some of the 
problems noted in the GAO report. The eRA evaluation now focuses more 
on the results of an institution's efforts to improve its community 
reinvestment perfonnance}O Larger institutions are rated under a three-part 
test that evaluates lending, investment, and retail service throughout the 
institution's service area based on standard quantitative data provided by the 
institution} 1 The increased reliance on quantitative data in the evaluations 
and a more results-based process are also designed to address the problem of 
inconsistent evaluations.32 Because small banking institutions have been 
particularly concerned with the paperwork burden imposed by the eRA,33 
the revised regulations include a streamlined examination for small banks 
and permits all banks to have their eRA perfonnance evaluated based· on a 
strategic plan approved by their regulator.34 
Despite these changes, dissatisfaction with the eRA remains. It was 
the GAO's opinion that the revised regulations will not solve many of the 
eRA's enforcement difficulties. eRA evaluations will still involve 
numerous subjective judgments by regulators and will still require the 
sophisticated analysis of quantitative data.35 The GAO was concerned about 
the ability of the regulatory agencies to devote the staff and other resources 
necessary for truly effective enforcement of the Act.36 Although many 
parties involved agree the revised regulations should be given a chance to 
work, there is a general feeling that total reevaluation of the Act may be 
necessary.37 
The role of community groups also presents a significant problem in 
the eRA scheme. These groups have a wide variety of goals and represent 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 46. 
30 See id. at 50. 
31 See id. at 36-38. 
32 See id. at 55, 59. The GAO also noted that training and examiner judgffient 
would be key to increased consistency in examinations. See id. 
33 See id. at 35. 
34 See id. at 39-40. 
35 See id. at 51-52. 
36 See id. at 62-64. 
37 Informal discussions that the authors have had with CRA,officers of banks from 
the Chicago metropolitan area earlier this year tend to support this assessment. 
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different constituencies.38 Although all probably agree that the banking 
industry should be pushed to increase community lending, they do not agree 
on the methods. Community lending initiatives that satisfy some groups are 
not acceptable to others.39 Many of the groups have noted that enforcing the 
CRA mandates is limited to denying an institution's application for 
expansion or generating negative publicity following a low CRA rating. 40 
Bankers have argued, on the other hand, that a CRA rating of "satisfactory" 
or better should shield them from protests 41 and the current system creates 
perverse incentives that discourage community lending.42 We note that this 
problem presents a substantial challenge to the current CRA framework, not 
only because it may keep banks out of certain neighborhoods, but also 
because of the distasteful political posturing it tends to generate. 43 Although 
the revised CRA regulations create a more objective standard for rating a 
bank's community lending performance, many community groups no doubt 
will continue to argue that banks receiving "satisfactory" or better ratings 
from the regulators still are not doing enough and that public pressure 
through negative publicity remains necessary. The conflicting demands of 
the banking industry and community groups make it extremely difficult to 
create regulations that satisfy all of the affected constituencies. The GAO 
concluded: 
The varied positions taken by the affected parties further 
demonstrate that the debate about how best to achieve the 
goals of community reinvestment is both complicated and 
contentious. The approach embodied in the current CRA 
statute uses the levers of compliance examinations and 
application approvals to increase community reinvestment 
lending. The new regulations are an attempt to generate 
better results with less regulatory burden. However, given 
38 For example, in Boston, some of the groups involved in ensuring community 
lending include those organized around specific neighbors, such as the Codman 
Square Neighborhood Development Corporation, and those organized around 
specific constituencies, such as the Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation. 
See Bad Credit in Dorchester, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1996, at A14. 
39 See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 35. 
40 See id. at 49. 
41 See id. at 6. 
42 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 340. 
43 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 281. 
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the positions of the different parties, it is not clear that the 
results will fully satisfy all of those parties.44 
ill. QUESTIONABLE PREMISES 
The current impasse regarding the eRA can be traced to some 
questionable premises underlying the statute, particularly given the economic 
and social realities of the I 990s. The oft-repeated idea behind the eRA is 
that financial institutions sometimes fail to meet the credit needs of the 
communities in which they are located;45 Of course, this is a vague charge. 
How does one define the credit needs of the community? Who defines these 
credit needs? No one has provided a clear answer to these questions. 
However, the basic sense of failure that motivated legislators to enact the 
statute can be described easily. Proponents of the legislation were concerned 
that depositors in older, minority-populated areas of inner-cities saw very 
little of their money return to their communities in the form of business loans 
or home mortgages.46 The implication is that those loans typically were 
provided to mortgage applicants and businesses located in wealthier 
neighborhoods.47 
Thus, in the eyes of the eRA's proponents, banks were reluctant to 
provide loans to applicants from inner-city, minority communities but they 
were quite willing to accept risk-free deposits from the same people. This 
coupled with the economic decline of most inner-cities during the late 1960s 
and 1970s 48 gave rise to the view that banks were facilitating a process of 
disinvestment in inner-city communities.49 Some proponents envisioned that 
44 GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 89. 
45 See id. at 16. 
46 See Marsico, supra note 14, at 287-88 (citing congressional intent, while 
drafting the CRA, to have banks return more credit to their communities). 
47 See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 298-99. 
48 See Michael P. Conzen, American Cities in Profound Transition: The New City 
Geography of the 1980s, in THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA 277, 283-85 
(Raymond A. Mohl ed., 1988) (analyzing various factors that contributed to the 
impoverishment of cities); see also John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated 
Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970 to 1990,4 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 253 
(1993) (stating, "[r]esults show that despite some encouraging, individual city 
turnarounds in the Northeast urban poverty concentration and neighborhood distress 
worsened nationwide between 1980 and 1990."). 
49 See Overby, supra note 4, at 1446; Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The 
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban 
America, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1285, 1311 (1995); see also Taibi, supra note 5, at 
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the statute would reverse this trend by forcing banks to lend in relatively 
under-served areas.50 
Because banks typically make loans not out of altruism but out of an 
intention to make a profit, it is important to point out why in the eyes of 
proponents banks were reluctant to lend in inner-city, minority communities. 
The term "redlining" has been used to describe the policies of banks, but the 
fundamental claim is that lending institutions discriminated against minority 
applicants or applicants from minority neighborhoods.51 Prior to the 
enactment of the CRA, there was some empirical evidence to support this 
charge. Much of it is referred to in the legislative history of the Act, 52 and it 
convinced many people that some type of action was necessary. 
This is the account - call it the community disinvestment story - that 
CRA advocates generally have accepted and continue to believe, and it 
contains three premises. First, banks should lend primarily in the areas in 
which they receive deposits. Second, banks refuse to do this largely because 
of discrimination against minority groups. Third, the economic decline of 
many inner-city, minority communities is due in substantial part to the 
lending policies of banks. 
The first premise - that banks should lend in the communities where 
they receive deposits - has been criticized by Macey and Miller,53 and 
although we do not agree entirely with their argument,54 we would point to 
the same flaws in the premise that they have identified. The fundamental 
flaw is that the "localism" premise confuses the role of banks as financial 
intermediaries. The premise rests on an assumption that banks should aim to 
do their business locally. But in their role as financial intermediaries, banks 
recently have not attempted to conduct their business on a local basis. 55 
Given a set of risk and return characteristics banks would consider acceptable 
for lending, they transfer money from geographic markets in which there is 
1484-86 (noting that "banks were redlining or neglecting important credit needs 
within their communities, and regulators' efforts to deter such behavior were 
inadequate. "). 
50 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 49, at 1316-20. 
51 See Overby, supra note 4, at 1450. 
52 See id. at 1453 (in a review of banking and credit legislation of the 1970s, 
describing the eRA as the "linchpin in the effort to ameliorate the problems of 
discrimination, redlining, and disinvestment"). For a thorough discussion of the 
history of the eRA, see Overby's comments at pages 1453-58. 
53 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 310-12. 
54 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 264-65 (discussing localism argument). 
55 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 305-06. 
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an excess supply of funds to those in which there is an excess demand.56 
Because communities differ in terms of lending risks and in terms of savings 
propensities, this implies some communities will receive fewer loans relative 
to their deposits than other communities. Further, banks increasingly solicit 
funds nationwide,57 which makes it more difficult today to make a general 
claim that local funds are being lent outside of the community. 
The localism premise has been discussed at length elsewhere,58 and 
we will not extend the debate here. The second and third premises (dealing 
with discrimination and causation, respectively) strike us to be more 
important, so we will focus on them in this section. 
A. Assessing the Plausibility of the Lending Market 
Discrimination Theory 
The literature on the economics of discrimination has offered two 
categories of discriminatory motive. One is taste-based discrimination, 
which refers to discrimination based solely on the discriminator's disutility 
or distaste for contact with members of the target group. 59 The other type of 
discriminatory motive is statistical or rational discrimination, which occurs 
when the discriminator uses race as a proxy for other information that would 
influence his decision.6o 
56 See, e.g., JAMES L. PIERCE, 1HE FUTURE OF BANKING 19-20 (1991). 
57 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 305-307. 
58 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 264-65; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, 
at 303-12; Overby, supra note 4, at 1483-91. 
59 Much of the literature regarding the "economics of discrimination" is due in 
large part to the work of Gary Becker. For information on taste-based 
discrimination, see GARY S. BECKER, 1HE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 
(2d ed. 1977). For a detailed discussion of the taste theory in the context of lending 
discrimination, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 250-59. A taste-based 
discriminator is willing to offer a payment, or to bid, to avoid contact with members 
of the group he dislikes. Thus, suppose a taste-based discriminator plans to see a 
certain movie - he can choose between two theaters close to his home. One theater, 
A, is frequented only by members of the group he likes (presumably his own group). 
The other theater, B, is frequented by members of the group he dislikes. The taste-
based discriminator will choose B over A only if the price charged by B is 
sufficiently lower than the price charged by A to compensate for the disutility of 
associating with members of the group he dislikes. 
60 See, e.g., Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of 
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 175 (1977); Edmund 
S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 659 
(papers and proceedings) (1972). For a discussion of statistical discrimination in the 
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In the context of the lending market, one can subdivide these 
categories of discrimination further still. A lender could discriminate against 
an applicant because of information about the applicant or because of 
information about the intended use of the loan. For example, a lender may 
be reluctant to extend credit once he finds out that the applicant is black. 
Alternatively the lender could be indifferent as to the race of the applicant, 
but unwilling to lend after learning that the loan would enable the applicant 
to purchase a home in a neighborhood with a high percentage of black 
residents. 
It could be seen as needless hair-splitting to create so many 
categories for examining discrimination, but these categories are useful in 
examining the plausibility of the discrimination premise. Let us start by 
considering the claim that lenders are taste-discriminators who focus 
primarily on the intended use of the loan. What this means is that a lender 
simply dislikes extending credit intended to fund activities in minority 
communities. 
This argument has a ring of implausibility. The taste-based 
discrimination theory is typically applied to the case of an employer who 
prefers not to associate with workers of a different race.61 The taste-based 
theory seems plausible in this setting because people generally come in 
contact with each other at the worksite. However, a loan officer can approve 
a loan going to support a business or home purchase in a minority 
community without ever having to set foot in the community. 
Consider the theory that banks are reluctant to lend to individual 
minority applicants because of taste-based discrimination against the 
applicant. This is somewhat more plausible than the previous theory because 
bank employees sometimes come into contact with loan applicants or the 
holders of bank loans. However, as the lending process becomes 
increasingly mechanized, and as discretion plays a less important role in the 
process,62 even this theory of discrimination begins to look less plausible. In 
today's lending market, there are mortgage brokers who shop around an 
information package on a home mortgage applicant that is largely confined to 
financial matters. The lenders who accept these packages often know 
context of lending, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 254-59. It should be 
clear from the discussion in the text that the statistical discriminator has no racial or 
group-based preferences; he simply uses group-identification as predictor of 
behavior. 
61 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 249-54. 
62 See Snigdha Prakash, Mortgage Lenders See Credit Scoring as Key to Hacking 
Through Red Tape, AM. BANKER, Aug. 22, 1995, at I, 10. 
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nothing of the non-financial personal characteristics (e.g., race) of the 
applicant. Credit scoring,63 and other mechanical processes, have become 
sufficiently common that the theory of taste-based discrimination in the 
lending market has become less plausible.64 
Still, mechanization of the lending process has not reached the stage 
that the non-financial personal characteristics of borrowers can be assumed 
to be irrelevant to the lending process. The interesting question is how taste-
based discrimination occurs in the lending process. The most persuasive 
account provided so far was suggested in the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston's study of residential lending discrimination.6s The study points out 
the importance of borderline applicants in the mortgage process: according to 
the study's authors roughly eighty percent of mortgage applicants are neither 
unambiguously good risks nor unambiguously bad risks by traditional 
standards,66 and within this large group of borderline applicants the 
discretion of the loan officer is applied. In this setting, there is room for 
taste-based discrimination to occur in spite of the existence of rigid 
assessment standards and laws prohibiting racial discrimination. 
The remaining theories of discrimination fall under the statistical 
discrimination category. We think it is fair to say that the statistical 
discrimination theory is more plausible in the context of the lending market 
than is the taste-based theory. The key weaknesses in the taste theory are 
that it requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the lender and direct 
contact between the discriminating lender and customers. But both of these 
features are no longer routine in the mortgage lending process and are 
becoming increasingly less common. 
63 Scoring systems use data from previous loan applicants and recipients to 
generate models that rate borrower attributes to determine creditworthiness. For a 
brief overview of credit scoring usage and a discussion of policy implications, see 
Warren L. Dennis and Christine DiBacco Bachman, Are DOJ and FTC Poised for 
Fair Lending Attack Against Credit Scoring? 14 BANKING POL'y. REp. 1 (1995). 
64 Of course, one could argue that mechanical processes in general remain flawed 
because they incorporate the discriminatory tastes of the programmers of the various 
mechanical methods. But under the model of taste-based discrimination, the 
important source of discrimination is the decision-maker's distaste for dealing with 
an undesirable group. If that distaste were incorporated directly into some algorithm 
for determining creditworthiness, the lender would, presumably, still have discretion 
as to whether to follow the algorithm. If the lender had no taste for discrimination, it 
(presumably) would deviate from the rules set out in the algorithm. 
6S See ALICIA H. MUNNEL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING 
HMDA DATA (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper Series No. 92-7, 1992). 
66 See id. at 12. 
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Furthennore, there are implications from the economics of 
discrimination literature that support the lending market statistical 
discrimination thesis.67 Perhaps the most important concerns the long run 
survivability of discrimination. The basic result is that in the long run, taste-
based discriminators will earn less than competitive returns.68 
To see why this holds true, let us step back for a moment and review 
some basic lessons from the theory of competition. In a competitive market, 
entry occurs until economic profits - the difference between revenue and the 
opportunity costs of capital used in production - are driven to zero.69 Thus, 
in the long run, firms earn zero economic profits.1o They earn what 
economists describe as a "nonnal" profit, which is just enough to compensate 
them for the risk and the opportunity cost of capital tied up in the 
enterprise.11 
Now consider what happens to the discriminator in an industry in 
which new competitors can enter easily. The taste-based discriminator 
demands to be compensated for the distaste or disutility he experiences in 
having to deal with or come into contact with members of the race he 
dislikes. In the employment context, the white taste-based discriminating 
employer would demand a wage reduction (relative to the wage paid to a 
white worker) in order to employ a black ~orker. In the lending market, 
taste-based discriminating lenders will demand a premium, in the fonn of a 
higher interest rate or higher up front fees, for dealing with black loan 
applicants. Because of his demand for compensation, the taste discriminator 
will of course earn a larger profit in each individual contract with a black 
loan applicant. However, this demand also puts the taste discriminator at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to non-discriminating lenders. Because 
they do not need to receive a premium to compensate for the distaste of 
dealing with black borrowers, non-discriminating lenders will be able to 
enter into a larger number of profitable contracts and may underprice 
discriminating lenders when dealing with black loan applicants. Put another 
67 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION 
IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24-26 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Becker, 
supra note 59, at 39-54. 
68 See Becker, supra note 59, at 39-54. 
69 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER. PRICE THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 202-03 (4th ed. 
Prentice-Hall, 1988). 
70 See id. 
71 See id.; see also KARL E. CASE & RAy C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF 
MICROECONOMICS, 195-96 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that a nonnal rate of profit is "the 
rate that is just sufficient to keep owners or investors satisfied"). 
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way, taste-based discrimination gives rise to opportunities for non-
discriminators to make "racial arbitrage" profits. 
Suppose, for example, that a taste-based discriminator is willing to 
make a loan to a black home mortgage applicant only if compensated by an 
additional quarter of a percent on the interest rate or an up-front fee equal to 
one percent of the amount borrowed (one "point"). If the lender attempts to 
disguise the racial surcharge by incorporating it into the interest rate, then his 
strategy is likely to be undone by competitors in the market for refinancing. 
Indeed, if it were routine for black mortgage holders to be charged 
uncompetitive interest rates by taste-based discriminators, non-discriminating 
lenders would have incentives to target refinancing offers to black home 
owners. Aware of the constraints in the refinancing aftermarket, the taste-
based discriminating lender might demand compensation in the form of an 
additional point at closing of the sale. But in this scenario the additional cost 
is so obvious to the borrower that one would think that non-discriminating 
lenders and mortgage brokers would be keen to exploit this opportunity. 
If entry into the lending market by non-discriminators is easy, the 
profits of taste-based discriminators in the lending market will be driven in 
the long run below the point at which a normal profit is earned. At this point 
there would be a potentially mutually-beneficial arrangement where 
discriminators sell their assets to non-discriminators, or discriminators 
simply exit the field and re-deploy non-specific capital to some other 
activity. The long run tendency, then, is for the market to penalize taste-
based discriminators. Unless they prefer to discriminate while receiving less 
than competitive returns, they will tend to exit the field at a higher frequency 
then non-discriminators, and thus make up a smaller share of the market over 
time. 
In the case of statistical discrimination it is not necessarily the case 
that the market will penalize discriminating firms. If a firm uses information 
on race as a cheap proxy for other information that is expensive to discover, 
the firm may be able to improve its position relative to competitors who do 
not take race information into account. In other words, statistical 
discrimination, provided race is a sufficiently accurate and cheap proxy for 
information on risk, does not necessarily generate potential racial arbitrage 
profits for non-discriminating lenders.72 
These implications for the survivability of discrimination can be 
applied to the banking context in order to aid our assessment of the 
plausibility of the discrimination hypotheses. On a superficial level the taste-
based discrimination theory seems difficult to reconcile with the fact that 
72 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 250-51. 
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banking is a competitive industry)3 It is possible, to be sure, for taste-based 
discrimination to exist in a competitive industry. There is nothing in the 
theory of competition to suggest that taste-based discrimination cannot exist 
in the short run, and even in the long run it may persist if taste-based 
discriminators are willing to accept less than competitive returns. However, 
the theory seems implausible in light of the scale of the allegedly 
discriminatory credit allocation pattern. Given the consistency of the pattern 
of decaying inner-cities surrounded by relatively wealthy suburbs, one would 
think that there are enormous profit opportunities if this pattern is in 
substantial part due to racial discrimination on the part of bank loan officers. 
In addition, the empirical evidence does not provide support for the 
taste-based discrimination theory. Recall that the taste discriminator would 
demand a premium in order to deal with black borrowers. This generates a 
racial arbitrage profit opportunity for non-discriminators, who can make 
money by underpricing discriminators in the market for black borrowers. 
Although these profits are eliminated in the long run through competition, 
one should expect in the short run to see a positive relationship between bank 
profitability and minority lending. A recent study by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System examined the relationship between lender 
profitability and the minority composition of the neighborhoods in which 
they made loans.74 The report concludes that the "influence of the minority 
composition of a neighborhood on risk or profitability is weak and 
inconsistent, when other determinants of risk and profitability are accounted 
for."75 
Direct examination of the behavior of presumptive non-
discriminators reveals little evidence that these firms behave differently from 
the typical lender. Who are presumptive non-discriminators? In many large 
cities, such as Chicago, there are black-owned banks.76 Whatever may be 
said of them, it is highly unlikely that these banks are taste-based 
discriminators against black loan applicants. However, among municipal 
depositories in Chicago, within-city loan to deposit ratios are lower for 
73 On the competitiveness of banking, see PIERCE, supra note 56, at 79-88. 
74 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., REp. TO THE 1030 
CONGo ON COMMUNITY DEV. LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTIT. 39-52 (1993) 
[hereinafter COMMUNITY LENDING REpORT]. 
75 [d. at 39. 
76 For example, in Chicago until roughly two years ago, there were three black-
owned banks: Drexel National Bank, Independence Bank of Chicago, and Seaway 
National Bank of Chicago. Drexel and Independence were purchased by the South 
Shore Bank of Chicago (a white-owned bank) two years ago. 
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minority-owned than for white-owned banks.n In general, minority-owned 
banks tend to perform less well on CRA evaluations than white-owned 
banks.78 A study by Harold A. Black, M. Cary Collins, and Ken B. Cyree 
presents evidence that black-owned banks are more likely to discriminate 
against black loan applicants,19 Thus, black-owned banks seem to be as 
reluctant to lend to black loan applicants as their white-owned counterparts. 
From the foregoing, it seems that the taste-based discrimination 
theory fails several simple preliminary tests of plausibility when examined in 
the context of the lending market. This is not to say that there could be no 
taste-based discrimination; this is an issue that deserves careful empirical 
analysis. But at this preliminary level of probing, there is little support for 
the theory that stands at the heart of the CRA' s justification. 
Recall that the alternative to taste-based discrimination is statistical 
discrimination, which in the context of lending implies that banks use 
information on race as a cheap substitute for more detailed information 
bearing on creditworthiness. To the extent firms have set up mechanized 
lending processes that do not incorporate information on the race of 
applicants, there is less room for race to be used even as a proxy for other 
variables that concern the lender. However, the large category of borderline 
loan applicants opens up an area for banks to use race information informally 
as a method of reaching decisions on marginal loan applicants. 
Let us return briefly to the process described by the Boston Federal 
Reserve Bank study.80 How would statistical discrimination affect lending 
decisions on marginal or borderline loan applicants? Several commentators 
have noted the phenomenon of "coaching" or the "thick file" phenomenon.81 
This refers to the fact that some borderline loan applicants receive help from 
loan officers. In some cases the coaching pays off and a borderline applicant 
who would otherwise have been rejected receives a loan from the bank. 
Unsurprisingly, the evidence suggests that white loan applicants are more 
77 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 255. 
78 See Robert B. Cox, Minority Banks Seen Lagging in eRA Arena, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 20, 1993, at 1. 
79 See Harold A. Black, M. Cary Collins & Ken B. Cyree, Do Black-Owned Banks 
Discriminate Against Black Borrowers?, 11 J. FIN. SERvo REs. 189,202 (1997). 
80 See MUNNEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 12. 
81 See, e.g., COMMUNITY LENDING REPORT, supra note 74, at 34; Swire, supra note 
6, at 819-20; LAWRENCE B. LINDSEY, BREAKING FREE FROM SOME OUTDATED 
MYTHS, ADDRESS TO A COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT CONFERENCE 5-6 (Sept. 21, 
1992) (transcript on file with author). 
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likely than black applicants to receive this coaching and to have thicker 
application files. 82 
A loan officer who rationalizes his discriminatory behavior may 
decide to favor white borderline applicants because he thinks they are more 
likely to speak favorably of the bank to other desirable customers. Viewed in 
this sense, the coaching process is similar to advertising. The bank views 
these expenditures as investment in the finn's goodwill. If such investments 
are likely to have higher payoffs when directed toward white applicants, the 
coaching process is likely to be racially biased. 
If this is an accurate description of the main source of racial 
discrimination in the home lending market, then it is easy to see how it may 
persist and also be difficult to discern. It may persist because it is profit-
maximizing; every bank has an incentive to tolerate a race-biased process as 
applied to borderline applicants. And since this process does not involve the 
bank refusing to accept unambiguously good risks because of racial 
discrimination, it is less likely that the sort of racially-motivated price 
competition (driven by the existence of racial arbitrage profits) that mitigates 
the effects of taste-based discrimination will be observed in this setting. 
Discrimination is difficult to discern because in this case it involves 
applicants who are not clearly qualified under traditional standards. 
In short, there is a plausible discriminatory process at work in the 
residential lending process. However, the process is considerably narrower 
than the community disinvestment story envisions. The community 
disinvestment story fails to take into account the constraining effect of 
competition on the ability of lenders to discriminate against minority loan 
applicants. Competition in the lending market makes it costly for banks to 
practice taste-based discrimination. The discrimination that does occur is 
most likely of the statistical type and is practiced within the set of marginal 
loan applicants.83 In addition, if competition is sufficiently vigorous, the 
statistical assumptions used by discriminators will have to be reasonably 
accurate, otherwise the discriminators will be punished by the market. 
82 See Swire, supra note 6, at 819-20. 
83 For empirical support, see RAPHAEL W. BOSTIC, THE ROLE OF RACE IN 
MORTGAGE LENDING: REVISITING THE BOSTON FED STUDY (Division of Research 
and Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System Working Paper No. 
1997-2, 1996). Bostic fmds that "significant racial differentials exist only for 
'marginal applicants and are not present for those with higher incomes or those with 
no credit problems. '" 
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B. Bank Lending Practices Are Major Determinant of 
Economic Decline in Inner-Cities 
The third premise of the community disinvestment story is that 
discrimination in lending has had a significant impact on the economic decay 
of minority communities. The most persuasive argument for this claim relies 
on the economic theory of externalities: lending for community investment 
purposes has an external effect because each dollar invested into restoring a 
home in a given block raises property values within the block.84 Thus, the 
private value of lending for community investment is likely to fall short of its 
"social value." Banks will tend to do too little lending for community 
improvement projects. 
This is a general argument that applies to all community investment 
projects, whether in white or minority neighborhoods. It suggests that in the 
absence of some subsidization efforts by the government there may be too 
little investment relative to the social optimum in community improvement 
projects. Of course, the interest from home equity loans is tax deductible, 
which suggests that the government already subsidizes some community 
improvement projects. In addition, there is strong social or peer pressure 
within many neighborhoods to make investments to maintain one's property. 
Further, nuisance law prevents people from totally ignoring the interests of 
others in maintaining their property.8S With all of these forces, it may well 
be that the level of community investment by property owners is the same as 
what would be observed in a world in which investors captured all of the 
external benefits of their investments. 
However, there is a potential under-investment problem, and it may 
be particularly severe in minority neighborhoods. If banks adopt 
84 On externalities and residential lending, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 
256-58; Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-
Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1561, 
1570-71 (1995). 
8S Nuisance law does not, in general, protect aesthetic interests. See Mathewson v. 
Primeau, 395 P.2d 183, 189 (Wash. 1964) (refusing to require defendant to remove 
swine and rubbish from land because nuisance law does not protect aesthetic 
interests); Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 
357,359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (stating that nuisance law does not protect claim 
to sunlight). However, if the defendant's failure to maintain their property creates 
some disturbance which invades the property of a nearby home owner, that home 
owner would have a valid nuisance claim against the defendant. If, for example, the 
defendant's property became infested with rats, creating a danger to nearby home 
owners, a nuisance action could be maintained against the defendant. 
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discriminatory lending policies, it may be rational for even non-
discriminating banks to refuse to make loans in minority communities. 
Knowing that the profitability of its loans are dependent on the willingness of 
other banks to extend credit within a certain neighborhood, a non-
discriminating lender may think that there are too few non-discriminators to 
make up for the shortfall in lending due to discrimination. In this case, the 
externality problem may give rise to a pattern of disinvestment. In the 
expectation that no substantial lending will be done within a minority 
community, lenders may rationally expect property values to decline in 
general. 86 In this case, investing in one property may raise its value and 
those of others, but not enough to offset the sum of declines resulting from 
the failure to maintain nearby properties. 
Although we find this story plausible, it is not entirely persuasive. 
The fundamental weakness in this account is that it puts the cart before the 
horse by focusing largely on the role of bank lending in the community 
investment process. How does the perception arise that there will be too 
little investment in minority communities? If the perception arises from the 
fact that within a certain community, there is too little investment by 
homeowners and residents, then banks cannot be held accountable for the 
lack of lending within that community. 
Many of the· social ills that lie at the base of the phenomenon of 
urban economic decline can be characterized either as lifestyle issues or as 
macroeconomic issues, and are unrelated to the lending policies of banks. 
Consider the lifestyle issue. A single parent household, for example, is 
unlikely to be one in which members of the household have time to do 
simple home improvement or maintenance projects. A community in which 
roving gangs paint graffiti on the sides of houses and buildings, and 
otherwise abuse the property of others, is unlikely to be one in which 
residents have an incentive to invest in property. 
The broader point is that in the communities in which there is no 
visible under-investment problem, one observes private, low-level individual 
and coordinated efforts that serve to maintain property values. Neighbors, 
realizing their common interests in maintaining the property, sometimes 
share equipment and help each other with maintenance tasks. This level of 
continual investment and coordination is supported by the expectation that 
86 See, e.g., Swire, supra note 6, at 823-25 (describing "strategic discrimination" 
where lenders fail to extend credit because of an expectation of falling property 
values in the future due to an absence of lending in an area). See also Klausner, 
supra note 84, at 1569 (stating that infonnation drawn from prior sales in an area 
helps facilitate transactions in the future). 
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low-level maintenance efforts are necessary in order to be accepted within 
the community, or, put another way, to be considered a good neighbor. One 
also finds, in these communities, a level of family cohesion that permits 
residents to expect a high degree of stability and public order. But in 
communities in which a large share of the families have dissolved or are in 
the process of dissolving, low-level investments to maintain property are 
almost surely not going to be made. Property values probably will decline in 
these neighborhoods, whatever banks do. In the absence of private, 
individual efforts to maintain and improve property it is unlikely that bank 
lending alone will be sufficient to maintain property values. 
Similarly, the macroeconomic changes that have led to economic 
decline in cities were in some cases the result of international trade,87 and in 
other cases the result of poor policies at the level of municipal government, 88 
or a combination of both. To the extent that these forces drive private 
investment decisions, banks enter the picture largely as facilitators, moving 
the traffic along but not controlling its direction. 
IV. PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
To this point we have criticized the key assumptions of many 
proponents and the legislative framers of the eRA. We are, of course, 
unable to prove that these premises are false; this requires empirical research. 
Some empirical research has been done on the question of lending 
discrimination, and for the most part it is inconclusive. 89 However, our aim 
is not to reexamine the empirical literature; rather our aim. to this point has 
been to suggest a framework from which the empirical evidence should be 
examined. We think the statute's premises are sufficiently questionable in 
today's climate that in the absence of strong evidence supporting them, there 
should be a presumption that the statute does not accomplish the goals 
proponents have set out for it. And even if the evidence could be thought to 
support the proponents' assumptions, the question remains whether there are 
more effective or less costly ways to do this. 
87 The most dramatic example is Detroit, Michigan, where the decline in the 
market share of the U.S. auto industry led to large increases in unemployment over 
the late 1970s. See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 193-
95 (1993). 
88 For a review which stresses the poor policy decisions, see America's Cities, 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 17 .. 
89 For a review of the empirical literature, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 
268-76. 
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We shift our focus now to the inadequacies in the incentives created 
by the statute. Thus, whether or not the premises are false, we ask here 
whether the statute is likely to accomplish its aims at a reasonable cost. 
Several commentators have suggested that the CRA may fail to 
provide the right incentives for banks to comply with its aims, 90 provided 
those aims can be stated with sufficient clarity .. We consider this issue in 
more detail here. The incentive problems can be grouped under two 
headings: inadequate incentives and perverse incentives. Under the former 
we will consider why the statute may provide insufficient incentives for 
banks to meet the goals of CRA proponents. Under the latter, we will 
discuss ways in which the statute actually works against the goals of its 
framers and proponents .. 
A. Inadequate Incentives 
Under the current enforcement framework, banks and thrifts are 
examined by one of the relevant federal regulatory bodies 91 for compliance 
with the CRA and graded according to the level of compliance. Compliance 
grades become an issue when the bank applies for approval for a merger, the 
acquisition of a new branch, or some other expansion. To simplify the 
discussion, we will focus on the merger as the relevant transaction. If the 
bank has received poor compliance grades, the regulatory body may refuse to 
approve the bank's merger application. However, the approval process is not 
limited to a mere consideration of the bank's compliance grades. Third 
parties are permitted to intervene and submit letters protesting the merger 
because of the bank's failure to comply with the CRA. The statute permits 
virtually anyone to intervene in this fashion. 92 
With this background in view, it is possible to see some of the 
obvious inadequacies in the current set of incentives. It should be clear that 
90 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 295; Lawrence 1. White, supra note 6, at 
287. 
91 The relevant agencies are: Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
On the structure of bank and thrift supervision, see R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE ECONOMY 55 (1994). 
92 Regulations for the examining agencies indicate that "interested parties" may 
file statements responding to applications for new domestic branches, relocations of 
main offices, mergers, charters, conversions to national charters, and deposit 
insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(c) (1997) (OCC regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 345.29(c) 
(1997) (FDIC regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(b) (1997) (Fed. Reserve Sys. 
regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29(c) (1997) (OTS regulation). 
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banks that do not have expansion plans do not have incentives to comply 
with the eRA. 
One might argue that it is the rare bank that does not have expansion 
plans. However, banking industry analysts have noted that one by-product of 
the recent wave of mergers is the expansion of the market's lower end. 93 As 
banks have merged, casting off redundant facilities and workers, some of the 
discarded assets and employees have found employment in banks serving 
small geographic markets. Industry analysts have described the industry as 
having a "barbell shape," with a mass of large banks serving large 
geographic markets on one end, another mass of small banks on the other, 
and relatively few medium-sized banks in between.94 At the lower end of 
this barbell, there is virtually no need for managers to be concerned about the 
eRA. Because these banks are catering to a narrow market and do not intend 
to expand, they are effectively immune from the eRA enforcement process 
thus giving them an advantage relative to large banks, partially offsetting the 
disadvantage of not being able to exploit economies created by size in the 
banking market. 
With respect to large banks, it is not entirely clear that they will have 
incentives to comply with the eRA. First, if the bank's managers have no 
intention to expand, their incentives to comply are weakened. But even if the 
bank's managers have expansion plans, or otherwise feel pressured to 
comply with the statute, they may only comply with the letter rather than the 
spirit of the statute. Banks no doubt study the methods regulators use to 
grade compliance. Banks have incentives to adopt the cheapest methods 
necessary to ensure approval or to avoid being put in an unfavorable public 
light. That may give rise to compliance stratagems that ensure an adequate 
compliance record without significantly furthering the goals of community 
development. 
A simple example illustrates this argument. Suppose regulators were 
to measure compliance by comparing the total volume of loans in lower-
income communities to those in upper-income communities. Suppose the 
bank serves two communities - the largely wealthy Park Place and the low-
income neighborhood, Marvin Gardens. The bank, aware that regulators will 
compare the total amount loaned in these two communities, could construct a 
good record under the regulator's criterion, either by reducing the amount 
loaned in Park Place or by increasing the amount loaned in Marvin Gardens. 
If, for example, Marvin Gardens has a small number of very expensive 
93 See Nikhil Deogun, Back to the Fray: Displaced by Mergers. Some Bankers 
Launch Their Own Start-Ups, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at A I. 
94 See Hylton &. Rougeau, supra note 6, at 281. 
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properties, the bank will want to extend credit to those owners. Of course, 
making loans to a small number of wealthy property owners in Marvin 
Gardens may enhance the bank's statistical compliance record while doing 
absolutely nothing to improve the welfare of low-income home owners or 
home searchers in Marvin Gardens. There are plenty of real world examples 
in which such a compliance strategy is available to a bank. For example, the 
"Gold Coast" area of Chicago includes pockets of concentrated poverty such 
as the Cabrini-Green housing project. A Chicago bank that happens to have 
one of these pockets of poverty within its service area would have a strong 
incentive under the statute to lend large amounts to wealthy residents living 
within the same service area. This does little to advance the goals of the 
statute. Indeed, it has the perverse effect of providing benefits largely to 
wealthy property owners in areas designated as "low-income," as banks bid 
more aggressively for their business. 
Since we are talking about cheap methods of avoiding problems 
under the statute, why not consider what a smart bank manager would do? 
Again, suppose we are in Chicago. A smart bank manager would call the 
city council member who represents the residents within the lower-income 
area of the bank's geographic market, and ask that representative to put her 
in touch with local interest groups that would most likely file CRA 
complaints in response to the bank's expansion plans. Having met the 
concerns of the representative and the local interest groups, the bank would 
be in a good position to seek expansion. Again, this approach toward 
compliance may not advance the goals of the statute. 
Perhaps the most troubling compliance stratagem revealed to date 
involved Fleet Financial Bank of Boston. Although the allegations have not 
been admitted to, reports emerged in the Fall of 1996 that the bank had 
entered into deals with property speculators to buy homes in at least one low-
income area of Boston and to resell the homes to minority and low-income 
residents at inflated prices.95 In one case, a house that had been bought for 
$55,000 by a speculator was sold less than two months later, with no 
improvements on record, for roughly $169,000.96 Since no rational bank 
would approve a mortgage on an inflated house, this left Fleet in the position 
of being the only bank that would lend to the unsuspecting home buyers. 
Why would Fleet approve mortgages on inflated houses in a low-income 
95 See Bad Credit in Dorchester, supra note 38, at A 14. 
96 See Steve Tripoli, News Report (WBUR, Boston, Massachusetts radio broadcast, 
Oct. 1997) (on file with authors). 
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area? Reports suggested that the bank needed to improve its CRA 
compliance record in order to carry out its expansion plans.97 
One could argue that a desirable result had been achieved: the bank 
made more loans within a low-income neighborhood. But if the allegations 
against Fleet are true, there may have been no social gain at all from the 
bank's activity. The houses probably would have been sold to someone at a 
price that could be supported by an independent appraisal. Fleet would not 
have held as many loans in low-income areas, but other banks would have. 
And what of the new owners of these inflated houses? They are burdened by 
high mortgage payments and face the prospect of a large loss if they try to 
sell. 
The examples considered so far assume that the bank regulator uses 
an objective or statistical test for compliance. Recent reform efforts have 
attempted to make the compliance review process more objective.98 As these 
examples demonstrate, objective compliance tests may provide incentives for 
banks to adopt compliance stratagems that satisfy regulators' objectives 
without really advancing the underlying goals of the CRA. 
Suppose, however, we consider a more subjective review process 
which focuses on banks' efforts to comply with the statute rather than 
statistical evidence on lending. This is, of course, the traditional method 
regulators have used to evaluate compliance. Is a subjective review process 
preferable to an objective one because of the greater ability of regulators 
under the subjective process to reject compliance stratagems that satisfy an 
objective criterion while failing to genuinely advance the goals of the statute? 
The answer probably is no. 
Under a subjective review process, banks still have incentives to find 
the cheapest methods to satisfy compliance examiners. As long as it is 
cheaper to produce documentation and paperwork (e.g., glossy brochures) 
97 See id; see also Kimberly Blanton, Regulators Studying Fleet Loan Practices, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1995, at 85 (stating, "Federal bank regulators are 
scrutinizing Fleet Financial Group Inc.'s minority lending practices as the company 
seeks approval to buy Shawmut National Corp."); James S. Hirsch, Critics Say a 
Well-Intentioned Loan Plan Helped Minorities Buy Overpriced Homes, WALL ST. J., 
July 20, 1995, at Bl (noting, "A bank program designed to aid minority-group 
members get home mortgage loans is facing charges that it has hurt some of those 
that it intended to help."); Jeffrey Krasner, Fleet, Cod man Square Group Target 
Lending Reforms, BOSTON HERALD, June 24, 1995, at 17 (indicating that "Fleet 
Bank officials and members of a Codman Square community group yesterday agreed 
to a sweeping array of mortgage lending reforms which both sides said could help 
prevent excessive lending on overpriced properties"). 
98 See discussion infra Section V.B. 
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than to take on risky loans, banks will have incentives under the subjective 
process to invest in the production of paperwork indicating an effort to 
comply rather than to actually extend loans to people in under-served 
communities. Further, because of the actual risk efforts to extend loans may 
not satisfy the examiner's unspecified concerns, banks have additional 
incentives to focus exclusively on the production of paperwork. The result of 
these incentives is a "community development" program in which most of 
the funds are devoted to administrative salaries and expenses. 
B. Perverse Incentives 
There are some ways in which the statute may serve to undermine its 
own aims. While a bank that happens to be within a geographic market that 
includes low-income residents may have enhanced incentives to work toward 
the goals of the statute, a bank that does not lie within such a service area has 
an incentive to stay outside. The statute clearly raises the cost of entering 
and operating within the very markets which the legislative framers and 
proponents claimed were under-served by banks.99 As fewer banks view 
low-income areas as desirable markets, the remaining banks serving those 
areas become less constrained by competition, permitting them to charge 
uncompetitively high fees and to engage in the very discrimination the statute 
aims to eliminate. This is a point that has been made before)OO However, 
the problem of perverse incentives runs considerably deeper. Let us return to 
the focal point of CRA enforcement activity: the merger. 
We noted earlier that the CRA is almost irrelevant to a bank that 
does not have expansion plans. This happens because compliance grades are 
important largely because they affect the likelihood of approval by regulators 
for expansion plans. This particular enforcement convention introduces 
important costs. We put them in two categories: rent-seeking and transaction 
costs. We aim to point out below that incentives are created to run these 
costs very high. There is no reason to think that these costs will not exceed 
the social benefits from a merger. 
1. Rent Seeking Costs 
a. Banks 
Consider the following example: bank A wants to acquire bank B, 
where B serves a geographic market that includes a large percentage of low-
income residents. Bank A's merger application is under review by the 
99 See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(2) (1994). 
100 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 340; White, supra note 6, at 287. 
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Federal Reserve Board. Suppose there are competing banks, C and D, who 
would also like to acquire bank B. Suppose there is another bank, E, who 
competes against B but has no expansion plans. 
Suppose further that the owners of A intend to reduce costs and 
compete more fiercely after the merger, and the estimated gains to A from 
this are $10 million ($1 million per year indefinitely discounted at 10% 
interest rate). E's losses if this transaction takes place will be $3 million. 
The competing bidders would each gain $5 million if they were permitted to 
take over B. Consider their incentives under the merger approval process. 
E's concern is that the merger may make B a stronger player in the 
local market. C and D would like to knock A out of the competition for 
acquiring B, though it may not be necessary to knock A out of the 
competition. It may be sufficient, for their purposes, to delay the process so 
that time-sensitive benefits from the merger between A and B evaporate. 
C, D, and E have strong incentives to file protests under the CRA. 
The value to each is substantial and the cost of filing a letter protesting the 
merger is minimal. However, they have an incentive to invest considerably 
more into the grievance process. E is willing to spend up to the expected 
value of a successful challenge in order to prevent the merger, which in this 
example is $3 million multiplied by the probability E's challenge is 
successful. C will spend up to the value of $5 miIlion multiplied by the 
probability that C emerges as the acquirer, and the same is true of D. Let us 
suppose the probability for either C or D emerging as victor is 112, 
conditional on knocking A out of the game, so that each is willing to invest 
up to $2.5 million into the protest. lOl 
C and D will help their case by finding evidence that suggests that 
the acquiring bank A either does not have a good compliance record, or is 
unlikely to have a good compliance record in this market. They will also 
have incentives to contact local interest groups and representatives and urge 
them to protest "the merger. 
As this example suggests, the stakes involved can be high even in 
small bank mergers. Because of the merger rents at stake for all of the 
parties, the grievance process encourages banks to invest large sums into the 
101 $2.5 million is the maximum the fInnS are willing to invest in the grievance 
process. They will spend less if the probability of excluding bank A from the 
process is less than one at all levels of expenditure. In general ftrms will choose a 
level of expenditure that maximizes the gain from the grievance. Thus, if G is the 
amount invested into the grievance process and p(G) is the probability of excluding 
A given an expenditure of G, banks C and D will maximize the expression p(G)($2.5 
million) - G. 
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complaint process. Surely bank E, with as much as $3 million at stake, will 
be able to discover important CRA concerns that should require regulators to 
delay the merger approval process. 
On a more general level, C and D have potential merger rents at 
stake. E, seeking protection from competition, has a regulatory rent at stake. 
It should be clear that by changing the numbers slightly the sum of the 
merger and regulatory rents can easily exceed the total gain to A from the 
merger, and perhaps all of the social gains from the merger. Thus, 
competition for merger rents and efforts to protect regulatory rents suggests 
that the particular enforcement process set up under the CRA may generate 
costs well in excess of the benefits. In addition, competition for rents drives 
up the cost of bank entry into the very markets in which additional lending is 
most desirable. 
b. Pressure Groups and Politicians 
Several commentators have noted that local pressure groups have 
incentives to demand payoffs from the merger applicant in order to withdraw 
CRA protests against a particular merger.102 They are aware that the merger 
rents at stake are substantial. The payoffs required to quiet them are small in 
relation to the merger stakes. 
Local politicians are also aware of the opportunities created by the 
CRA review process.103 Few things look more impressive to the public than 
a public servant standing up against a powerful financial institution to force 
that institution to take the interests of its potential customers into account. 
Realizing this, the enterprising politico need not wait for the local pressure 
groups to approach her; she can approach them first. She can volunteer to 
serve as a mediator between the merger applicant and the local pressure 
groups. With her guidance, the pressure groups can gain information on the 
reasonableness of a settlement demand. 
These costs are generally small in relation to the merger stakes. 
However, to the extent this activity delays the merger process it can 
significantly increase the likelihood that the whole deal will fall through. 
2. Transaction Costs 
It is obvious that the transaction costs of a merger are increased by 
the current enforcement framework, and thus fewer bank mergers will occur 
as a result. Of course, this is true of virtually all regulations that affect 
102 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 333-34. 
103 See id. at 296. 
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mergers. One unique feature of the eRA is that it substantially increases the 
transaction-specific investments made by the merger applicant.I04 
Suppose the merger applicant is not discouraged by the prospect of 
delay and the costs of responding to eRA complaints. Further suppose the 
merger applicant invests large sums of time and· money into making peace 
with local politicians, pressure groups, local competitors, and all other parties 
who raise eRA issues. At the end of this process, the bargaining landscape 
between the potential acquirer and target has changed. 
The target realizes that the merger applicant has made an enormous 
investment in this single transaction. Of course, there are some general skills 
that the applicant has learned. The applicant will be better prepared in the 
future to negotiate mergers, having seen what is required in this one. But the 
deals cut with complainants in this special case have no value to the bank in 
future expansion applications in other areas. 
For example, suppose at the start of the merger discussions, a price 
of $50 million was offered and tentatively accepted by the acquisition target. 
Suppose over the course of regulatory review, the value of the bank's assets 
declines by $5 million. Note that the cost of walking away from the 
transaction has increased for the merger applicant. If the target refuses to 
lower its price, the applicant can refuse to carry out the transaction. 
However, the target probably realizes. that the acquiring bank does not want 
to forfeit its heavy investment into eRA approval. The target is going to be 
less willing to lower its price. 
The point here is of course not limited to the eRA. To the extent 
mergers have to meet any regulatory approval whatsoever, this creates a 
transaction-specific investment which alters the bargaining positions of the 
parties over the course of the regulatory review process. However, the eRA 
is according to many accounts the most costly and time-consuming 
component of the bank merger approval process.105 In addition, it involves 
making investments that are quite useless in future expansion efforts.106 
v. ALTERNATIVES TO THE eRA 
We do not know whether the costs ofthe eRA outweigh the benefits. 
However, we have suggested so far that the benefits are considerably 
narrower than proponents have envisioned. In addition, the administrative 
costs by all accounts are high. What is more important in our view is that the 
104 See id. at 331. 
lOS See id. at 331-32. 
106 See id. at 295-96. 
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enforcement structure discourages banks from entering under-served markets 
and sets up incentives to waste resources. In particular, parties have 
incentives to exhaust the rents associated with the merger and regulatory 
processes, and these costs provide an additional disincentive to entry. 
Because the sum of these costs is likely to be large relative to the social 
benefits from enforcement, it is probable that the total costs generated by the 
statute exceed the benefits. 
In this section, we briefly consider alternatives to the CRA. We start 
with general views on desirable changes in the enforcement method and 
move on to consider current legislative proposals. 
A. Changing Enforcement 
It should come as no surprise that our most basic suggestion is that 
the merger process be removed as a focal point for enforcement of the CRA. 
In addition, we think there are several reasons for shifting to a subsidization 
approach under the statute; for example, rather than penalizing banks for 
having a poor compliance record, regulatory agents should only offer 
rewards to banks that have strong compliance records. In terms of 
compliance incentives, a subsidy is capable of achieving the same level of 
compliance as a penalty. The incentive to comply with the CRA's goals is 
determined by the difference between the reward for complying and the 
penalty for failing to comply. Under the current framework, there is no 
special reward for complying while the penalty is denial by regulators of an 
application to expand the bank's activity. The same incentives can be 
achieved by removing the penalty and substituting some reward for proving 
compliance with the statute's goals. 
There are several reasons for a change to a pure subsidy approach. 
First, although the statute has been viewed by proponents as a useful tool for 
combating discrimination in the lending market, that is not its sole focus. A 
bank can prove that it has never discriminated against a lender on the basis of 
the lender's race or the minority composition of the neighborhood for which 
the loan is intended and yet still face the problem that its level of lending 
may be deemed inadequate to meet the credit needs of its service area.107 As 
many commentators have noted, banks that choose a conservative strategy, 
or banks that choose not to make a substantial business of home lending, are 
penalized. 108 
To the extent that the statute constrains banks from pursuing 
diversified strategies, it is equivalent to penalizing manufacturers for not 
107 See Guttentag & Wachter, supra note 15, at 3. 
108 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 312-13, 317-18. 
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making a broader range of products. For example, if one were to follow the 
logic of the statute's proponents and apply it to the auto industry, luxury car 
makers should be penalized for not making cars that meet the needs of the 
average consumer. But diversification in the car market, and most other 
markets, has benefited consumers by permitting firms to meet consumer 
needs more cheaply through specializing in narrow areas of the market. 
In view of the benefits of specialization and diversification, the 
proper approach by a government that aims to increase production of a 
certain item is to subsidize either its production or consumption. The same 
holds in the markets for lending to finance home purchases and business 
expansion in inner-city communities. 
Another powerful reason for a subsidization approach is observed 
when we consider the long run effects of the eRA. In spite of the incentive 
issues noted in the previous section of this article, the eRA may very well 
encourage banks in the short run to do more lending in their service areas. 
However, there is little doubt that the statute discourages banks from moving 
into areas in which they will incur greater scrutiny under the statute. While 
penalties discourage banks from moving into inner-city, minority 
communities; subsidies would encourage them to move into these areas. 
Banks would incur expenses in efforts to prove compliance with the eRA, 
but this is not a concern under a subsidization scheme because the banks 
would do so voluntarily in the expectation that the future rewards would 
outweigh the compliance costs. If no bank attempted to comply with the 
statute, then the government could infer that the costs of compliance were too 
high relative to the subsidies. 
Although we think a subsidy approach is superior to the existing 
enforcement framework, it is not perfect. In particular, two general problems 
are connected with a subsidy scheme. First, if the subsidy is provided 
directly to banks - in the form of relaxed regulatory constraints, a reduction 
in taxes, or an outright transfer payment - then the problems of inadequate 
and perverse compliance incentives remain. Banks will be encouraged, as 
they are now, to find cheap or fast methods of proving compliance with the 
statute. Some of these methods, such as the scheme allegedly masterminded 
by Fleet Financial Bank,I09 may do nothing to enhance community 
development and leave borrowers worse off. 
The second general approach to subsidization is to offer the reward 
directly to borrowers who meet certain qualifications, perhaps in terms of 
income or in terms of the neighborhood of the residence for which the loan is 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
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intended. However, direct subsidies to consumers can also have some 
undesirable incentive effects. 
Suppose, for example, the subsidy is in the form of mortgage 
insurance, such as that provided by Federal Housing Authority ("FHA")} 10 
Such insurance schemes may weaken the incentives of borrowers to protect 
the value of the underlying asset, a problem generally known in the insurance 
literature as moral hazard. Certainly one of the reasons a homeowner makes 
investments in maintaining and improving one's property is to maintain or 
enhance its value to a prospective buyer. If the homeowner's mortgage 
payments are insured by the government, the option of stopping payments 
and forfeiting the property will probably be less costly. As the costs of 
letting the property decline in value fall relative to the costs of upkeep, one 
should expect to see less effort put into maintaining the property. In addition 
to the potential effect on the incentives of homeowners, an insurance scheme 
has the more familiar moral hazard problem affecting banks: to the extent 
that lenders are shielded from the consequences of default, they have 
incentives to pass poor risks on to the public treasury. 
Some of the problems outlined earlier in connection with the merger 
process might reappear if a subsidy approach were used in connection with 
expansion applications. Suppose, for example, the merger process is 
streamlined for a bank with high CRA ratings. If third parties are allowed to 
intervene and contest the bank's CRA performance, then some of the rent-
seeking behavior currently associated with the statute's enforcement would 
remain. Although firms whose real reason for opposing the merger of two 
rivals is fear of competition would no longer be able to use the CRA to block 
the merger, they would still have incentives to file CRA protests in order to 
delay the merger. 
110 The FHA sponsors a number of mortgage insurance programs. For single 
family mortgage insurance, the FHA uses the value of the property to determine 
eligibility. Maximum property values are set according to a percentage of the 
median home price in an area, or according to the figures given in the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation Act. The FHA also has guidelines for maximum loan to 
value ratios. FHA programs require an up-front mortgage premium payment, and 
the term cannot exceed 30 years. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.18. The low cost and 
moderate income mortgage insurance program sets eligibility according to income 
levels and restricts the program to properties worth less than a given dollar amount. 
See 24 C.F.R. pt. 221 (1998). For information on the development of government 
mortgage insurance programs, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the 
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of 
Home EqUity FinanCing, 69 TVL. L. REv. 373, 394-96 (1994). 
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These problems suggest that although a subsidy scheme would be 
superior to the existing framework, it would not necessarily eliminate all of 
the undesirable features observed in the present regime. Whatever its form, 
any subsidy would have the desirable effect of removing the long run 
disincentive, existing in the present enforcement regime, for banks to move 
into areas that are currently considered to be under-served. Moreover, any 
subsidy would remove the private compliance costs of banks as a political 
issue, allowing a more open discussion of the societal costs of compliance 
with statute. However, beyond these two significant benefits, the relative 
merits of alternative subsidy schemes would have to be considered in light of 
the incentive issues raised in each proposal. 
The ideal subsidy would probably go directly to the purchaser in the 
form of a fixed sum, in order to improve the purchaser'S ability to meet the 
requirements of lenders. Perhaps the simplest scheme would be a tax 
deduction for individuals who purchase homes in certain communities. The 
tax deduction approach could be expanded for money donated to funds or 
firms that specialize in community development. The fixed-sum subsidy to 
consumers would avoid the moral hazard issues raised above. In addition, 
the fixed-sum to consumers, as a substitute to the current enforcement 
approach, would entirely avoid the rent-seeking behavior described earlier in 
this paper. 
The subsidy to consumers would raise the problem of determining 
the specific areas in which consumers could qualify for the tax deduction or 
transfer payment. But this is an issue that can be resolved easily on a 
statistical basis. Census figures would permit regulators to easily determine 
the communities in which investment should be encouraged. Indeed, it 
would be far easier to determine the communities in which investment should 
be encouraged than to determine whether a particular bank had really made 
serious efforts to lend in such a community. 
B. Comprehensive Community Redevelopment and Current 
Legislative Proposals 
An alternative to the pure subsidy approach outlined above is an 
attempt to deal directly with the root causes of economic decline in inner-city 
communities. To date, the one legislative proposal that combines a subsidy 
approach to CRA enforcement with a comprehensive approach to revitalizing 
these communities is the American Community Renewal Act of 1997, III 
III See H.R. 1031, 105th Congo (1997). A similar bill was introduced in the Senate 
by Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.). See S. 432, 105th Congo (1997). Portions of the 
Renewal Act, including the education voucher program and funding for faith-based 
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sponsored by Republican representatives J. C. Watts of Oklahoma and Jim 
Talent of Missouri and Democratic representative Floyd Flake of New York. 
The bill would create 100 "Renewal Communities" across the country and 
would also focus on supporting families and rebuilding neighborhood 
institutions in the areas selected,l12 These communities would be chosen 
based on the existence of pervasive poverty and economic distress.113 
Incentives such as tax credits, regulatory relief, and low-interest loans would 
be offered to businesses and individuals who invested in these 
neighborhoods.1I4 By making certain approved types of investments in 
Renewal Communities, banks would be able to satisfy their obligations under 
the CRA.IIS 
Although the comprehensive-community approach of the Watts-
Talent proposal makes the mistake of keeping much of the current CRA 
enforcement framework intact, it offers the hope of going considerably 
further than would a subsidy approach in addressing the under-investment 
problem. As we noted earlier, banks are unlikely to lend to businesses or 
home purchasers in communities in which the local businesses and property 
owners themselves are unwilling to invest. 116 By increasing the level of 
investment in declining communities, the bill would reduce the risk faced by 
banks considering whether to lend in these communities. This, in tum, 
should reduce the size of the subsidy needed to induce banks to increase their 
lending. 
Another active legislative proposal that seeks revisions to the CRA is 
the Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1997. 117 Sponsored by 
Republican representative Bill McCollum of Florida, the legislation sets forth 
a modified evaluation procedure for certain mid-sized financial institutions 
that have received CRA ratings of "satisfactory" or better and are in 
compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. It also introduces what is 
substance abuse treatment programs, have generated some opposition on church-
state separation grounds. For different viewpoints on the drug treatment program, 
see Morning Edition: Community Renewal Act (National Public Radio broadcast, 
Feb. 19, 1997). For arguments regarding the school voucher program, see J.C. 
Watts, Jr., NAACP Loses Its Way on Education Rights, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, 
at A18. 
112 SeeH.R.I031, 105th Cong. §§2, 1400(a)(2)(A)(1997). 
113 See id. § 102. 
114 See id. §§ 2(b), 102. 
liS See id. § 403. 
116 See supra Section III.B. 
117 H.R. 221, 105th Congo § 4 (1997). 
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known as a "safe harbor" provision, which would prevent the denial of 
requests for new facilities on CRA grounds if an institution has received a 
CRA rating of "outstanding" or "satisfactory" in the two years preceding the 
request. 118 The safe harbor concept has generated a great deal of controversy 
over the last several years.119 As proposed in the Community Reinvestment 
Improvement Act, the safe harbor simply allows institutions that have 
performed well under the CRA to escape additional CRA scrutiny when they 
expand. 120 
Safe harbor proposals solve only some of the CRA's problems. To 
the extent they remove the merger process as focal point for enforcement, 
they are desirable. However, they do little to affect the long run 
disincentives for community development created by the statute. To remove 
the disincentives, a subsidy or abandonment of the current enforcement 
process IS necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The CRA, as it is currently enforced, is of doubtful value as a 
mechanism for encouraging or promoting investment in economically 
declining inner-city communities. The enforcement framework fails to 
provide adequate incentives for banks to comply with the goals of the statute 
and in some cases provides perverse incentives. It is time for Congress and 
banking regulators to redesign the enforcement process with a view toward 
subsidizing community investment efforts. 
118 See id. § 4. 
119 Many opponents argue that safe harbors let fmancial institutions escape their 
community lending responsibilities too easily. "Outstanding" and "Satisfactory" 
CRA ratings are what the vast majority of fmancial institutions receive, therefore 
safe harbors can make it very difficult for community groups to challenge an 
institution's CRA perfonnance. Safe harbor proponents, on the other hand, argue 
that a bank which meets its CRA obligations should not be held hostage to the threat 
of community group protests whenever it contemplates expansion. 
120 See H.R. 221, lOS th Congo § 4 (1997). 
